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Refunctionalizing a Frayed American China-Taiwan 
Policy: Incrementalism or Paradigmatic Shift? 
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This paper examines how the changing parameters in the post-Cold 
War era have challenged the "the Shanghai Communique paradigm " . 
(SCP), which has governed US.-Taiwan-China relations since 1972. 
By focusing on the SCP's two main pillars - "one China" and 
"strategic ambiguity" - this paper analyzes whether they can still 
stand the test of the time or best serve U.S. interests. The fundamental 
question this paper seeks to ask is: "How should the US. deal with 
Taiwan in the post-Cold War era?" Can the US. develop further 
relations with Taiwan based on Taiwan's intrinsic value? Or will 
Taiwan remain just a factor -- a negative or residual one -- in the 
broader China policy of the US.? Will the SCP continue to serve the 
best US. interests? Or will a new policy reflecting present realities be 
called for? If that is the case, what should this new policy be? What 
impact, if any, does the end of the Cold War have on US.-Taiwan 
relations? 
This paper is interested in exploring whether it is possible for the US. 
to pursue parallel relationships with Taiwan and China, that is, 
whether US.-Taiwan relations can be "decoupled" from the 
Washington-Beijing relationship? This paper uses a spatial model to 
review how US.-Taiwan relations have evolved since 1949, when the 
reality of two Chinas set in with the founding of the P RC. It discusses 
the increasingly unbalanced "dual track" framework of current US. 
policy toward China and Taiwan and contrasts the changing contexts 
between the SCP's time and the present post-Cold War era. It 
examines those most important new parameters that were absent or 
different in the SCP. Based on this contrast, the paper questions the 
policy's continued validity and calls for a new paradigm to replace the 
SCP. Based on these new parameters, the final section sketches out a 
new paradigm for US. policy toward Taiwan in the post-Cold War era 
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and weighs the pros and cons of three distinct policy choices -
disengagement, decoupling, and improved status quo --for the shape 
and direction of future US.-Taiwan relations. By bringing 
developments up to date (President Bush's December 9, 2003 
~omments regarding Taiwan's referendum), this paper argues that 
although the Bush Administration seems content to refunctionalize a 
frayed framework, it has abandoned "strategic ambiguity" and has 
added preference for the status quo . 
. Key words: U.S.-Taiwan relations, Shanghai Communique, 
strategic ambiguity, strategic clarity, dual-track policy, 
one China policy, post-Cold War, triangular 
relationship, spatial model. 
INTRODUCTION 
With Taiwan's March 2004 presidential elections in high gear, 
and the incumbent President Chen Shui-bian staking on conducting a 
, . "defensive · referendum" that calls on China to withdraw its missiles 
targeted against Taiwan to improve his reelection bid, 1 the United 
States intervened once again in the delicate triangular relationship 
a..-nong Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. On December 9, 2003, with 
the visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at his side, U.S. President 
George Bush stated, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either 
China or Taiwan to change the status quo ... and the comments and 
actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing 
to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we 
oppose."2 
1 For the purpose of this paper, 'Taiwan" refers to the Republic of China (ROC) 
whose capital is in Taipei, and "China" refers to the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) whose capital is in Beijing. 
2 George Gedda, "Bush Warns Taiwan on Independence," Associated Press, 
4 Tamk.ang Journal of International Affairs 
Pundits speculate whether Bush's statement signifies that the U.S. 
has jettisoned its policy of "strategic ambiguity" and replaced it with a 
policy of greater clarity that shows a clear preference on maintaining 
the status quo and buttressed by a dual deterrence against Beijing 
(from using force against Taiwan) and Taipei (from provoking China 
with moves that can be construed as moving toward formal 
independence). 3 
This ongoing debate is unlikely to be settled any time soon, since 
"the status quo is not static." Fast-changing developments will 
continue testing the policy. But any breakthrough or departure from its 
conceptual robustness and practical effectiveness must begin with an 
understanding of its origin - the Shanghai Communique. 
The Shanghai Communique Paradigm 
For more than three decades, United States policy toward Taiwan 
has been guided by the so-called "one China" policy established in the 
1972 Shanghai Communique -- the historic document paving for the 
normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. Washington's "one China" 
policy was summarized in the oft-cited diplomatic fiction: "the U.S. 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China ... The U.S. reaffirms its interest in peaceful settlement of the 
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves" (emphasis added). 
The principles of "one China" and "peaceful settlement," 
enshrined in the Shanghai Communique, were retained in the two later 
communiques with the PRC. 4 Together these principles formed a 
December 9, 2003. 
3 
"The End of Ambiguity," editorial, The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2003, 
A18; Kathrin Hille and James Kynge, "Bush Changes Tack in Strait of Taiwan: The 
US Has Abandoned its 'Strategic Ambiguity' on Beijing's Rivalry with Taipei," The 
Financial Times, December 11 , 2003, 3; Jim Hoagland, "The Real Message on 
Taiwan," The Washington Post, December 14, 2003, B7. 
4 The three U.S.-PRC joint communiques are: the Shanghai Communique (February 
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paradigm for both intellectual discourse and policy debates. 
Many U.S. elites tout this policy framework and seem content to 
continue it indefinitely. Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Clinton 
Administration, testified at Congress: "This 'one China' policy has 
worked exceptionally well, and has enabled the U.S. to achieve 
progress toward all of U.S. objectives." He listed these objectives as 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area, constructive engagement 
with China, continuation of strong economic and cultural relations 
.with the people ofTaiwan, and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue 
by the Chinese themselves. 5 
We label this policy framework the "Shanghai Communique 
paradigm" (SCP), borrowing the concept from Thomas Kuhn, 6 who 
defines .a paradigm as a predominant view to understand and explain a 
phenomenon at a given time. Hence, when a prevailing paradigm can 
no longer explain the phenomenon in question, it will be replaced by a 
newer and presumably better paradigm. Kuhn's view on human 
intellectual evolution- that it is often non-linear and non-cumulative-
contrasts greatly with the well-accepted theory that most public policy 
changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary.7 
27, 1972); Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
(January 1, 1979), and the August 17, 1982 Communique on U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan. The texts can be found in Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The 
United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992), 
Appendices B, C, and D, pp. 373-390. 
5 H. Con. Res. 63, Relating to the Republic of China (I'aiwan's) Participation in the 
United Nations, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, August 3, 1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 29-35, 66-71. 
6 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
7 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 197 8). 
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The SCP has dominated the policy and academic communities 
for so long that it has dwarfed those studies that attempt to look into 
potential policy alternatives or even question the enduring validity of 
this "paradigm." At times it seems that any natural evolution or human 
efforts that can upset this delicate equilibrium are discouraged. 
Our paper attempts to "think the unthinkable." It asks whether 
change to the SCP would be a paradigmatic shift or incremental 
adjustment - if any is possible at all. 
Costs and Validity 
We argue that the SCP has bred an intellectual complacency that 
fails to recognize two flaws. First, the "one China" policy embodied in 
the Shanghai Communique, though allegedly beneficial to all parties, 
also entails costs. The costs are mainly borne by Taiwan. In a nutshell, 
the SCP's continued success relies primarily on Taipei's continued 
"cooperation" to accept an ambiguous status thrust upon it mainly for 
Washington's convenience and interests. According to a long-time 
observer of U.S .-Taiwan relations: 
[Many] Americans feel a strong moral commitment toward 
Taiwan. They ask, "What has Taiwan done wrong to deserve 
this?" Nothing, of course. Taiwan just happened to be on the 
wrong side of history. Hence, many Americans feel guilty 
about betraying an old friend, Taiwan, in order to make a 
new friend, China. 8 
The rapid democratization smce the 1980s and the rise of a 
distinctive national identity in Taiwan have raised fundamental 
questions about whether Taiwan will continue "acquiescing" to either 
"one China" or "Taiwan is a part of China." 
At the same time, the policy also entails costs to the U.S. 
Washington's position on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue 
8 Robert Sutter, Congressional Research Service, personal interview, July 7, 1997. 
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is buttressed by its strong yet vague commitment (arguably less vague 
now) toward Taiwan's security as mandated in the Taiwan Relations 
Act (to be discussed later). Strategic ambiguity is said to serve U.S. 
interests. So the continued success of the "companion" of the "one 
China" policy -- the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue --
depends on Beijing's continued deference to the "strategic ambiguity" 
inherent in U.S. policies. A dilemma for Washington may thus arise 
when Beijing decides to test the extent of U.S. commitment, by 
attacking Taiwan. 
A second lacuna inherent in the dominant paradigm is that few 
analysts seriously take into account the changing context of the 
Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangular relationship. Using a good 
paradigm for a bygone era will be problematic. 
The crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, in which China conducted 
missile tests aJ?.d military exercises during Taiwan's first direct 
presidential elections, revealed that this policy has been stretched to 
the. limits, and has become increasingly untenable. The SCP has 
shown signs of having outlived its zeitgeist. Many factors that were 
not present in 1972 are present today. It is high time to examine these 
new parameters that pose a real challenge to the continued validity of 
the U.S. "one China" policy. 
Plan ofthe Paper 
This paper seeks to explore some of these new parameters and 
evaluate whether the two most important components of the Shanghai 
Communique paradigm as it relates to U.S.-Taiwan relations- "one 
China" and "strategic ambiguity" -- can still stand the test of time or 
best serve U.S. interests. More fundamentally, this paper asks, "How 
should the U.S. deal with Taiwan in the post-Cold War era?" Can the 
U.S. develop further relations with Taiwan based on Taiwan's intrinsic 
value? Or will Taiwan remain just a factor -- a negative or residual one 
--in the broader China policy of the U.S.? Will the "one China" policy, 
which aHegedly has served U.S. national interests well since 1972, 
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continue to serve the best U.S. interests? Or will a new policy 
reflecting present realities be called for? If that is the case, what 
should this new policy be? What impact, if any, does the end of the 
Cold War have on U.S.-Taiwan relations? 
This paper examines whether it is possible for the U.S. to pursue 
parallel relationships with Taiwan and China, that is, whether U.S.-
Taiwan relations can be "decoupled" from the Washington-Beijing 
relationship? By using a simple spatial model, the second section will 
first provide a brief overview on how U.S.-Taiwan relations have 
evolved since 1949, when the reality of two Chinas set in with the 
founding of the PRC. The third section will discuss the increasingly 
unbalanced "dual track" framework of current U.S. policy toward 
China and Taiwan. The fourth section contrasts the changing contexts 
between the SCP's time and the present post-Cold War era. It 
examines those most important new parameters that were absent or 
different in the SCP. Based on this contrast, the paper questions the 
policy's continued validity and calls for a new paradigm to replace the 
SCP. Based on these new parameters, the final section sketches out a 
new paradigm for U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the post-Cold War era, 
and speculates on several scenarios for the shape and direction of 
future U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
EVOLUTION OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
The Taiwan Issue: A Cold-War Legacy 
The end of the Cold War helped to heal many old wounds, such 
as the division of Germany, and the Israel-Arab conflict. But one 
glaring exception is Taiwan. A nation of 23 million people and an 
economic powerhouse, Taiwan is excluded from the United Nations 
(UN) system, and is recognized by only 27 (mostly small and 
unimportant) states. 
The incongruence between Taiwan's growing economic might 
and its diminutive diplomatic status is an infamous legacy of the Cold 
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War. The prec1p1tous and steady decline in Taiwan's international 
status was caused by the geostrategic realignment resulting from the 
split between two Communist giants, the Soviet Union and the PRC, 
and the Nixon Administration's decision to seize that opportunity. 
Taiwan, a founding member of the UN, was expelled from the body in 
1971 to make room for Beijing. The next year President Nixon went 
to China and signed the Shanghai Communique to normalize U.S.-
PRC relations. These events led to an avalanche of derecognition of 
Taiwan by major countries including Japan and the U.S. As China's 
importance in world affairs grew, most major powers came to tacitly 
accept Beijing's stance on Taiwan. 
As a result, Taiwan, which used to be widely accepted as a 
sovereign state, mysteriously came to be seen as neither sovereign nor 
a state. For the U.S., which used to recognize the ROC government as 
"the sole legal government of China," Taiwan became neither legal 
nor a government. "What did Taiwan do or what happened in Taiwan 
so that suddenly it did not have the sovereignty it once had?" mused 
Gary L. Ackerman, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific of the House ofRepresentatives.9 
This result is theoretically unexpected in international law, 
because the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States stipulates that "the political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition by the other states" (Article 3) and "recognition is 
unconditional and irrevocable" (Article 6). 10 This gap -- between 
what ought to be and what is -- must be explained by the policies 
9 U.S. House of Representatives, Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United Nations? 
(Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees on International Security, International 
Organizations, and Human Rights, and Asian and Pacific Affairs), 1 03rd Congress, 
2nd Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 35. 
10 The text of the Convention can be found in Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, 
and Anthony A. D'Amato, eds., Basic Documents in International Law and Order 
(St. Paul, MN: West, 1980). 
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pursued by the major powers, including the U.S., during the Cold War. 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan during the Cold War had operated 
largely under a "one China" framework. In fact, the official U.S. "one 
China" policy predated the Shanghai Communique. As a practice, the 
"one China" policy has meant that the U.S., at any given time, during 
and after the Cold War, maintains formal diplomatic ties with only one 
Chinese government and recognized it as the sole legitimate 
government of all China. This policy took advantage of the fact that 
both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, the two nemeses of the 
Chinese civil war, ironically shared the commitment toward one China, 
although neither would consider the other as anything more than 
illegitimate. Washington appropriated this "one China" myth to 
advance its self-interest, at that time isolating Communist China.11 
The ROC government on Taiwan benefited from this policy 
during the "hot" Cold War; the U.S. recognized it until 1978. But 
starting with detente, and with President Carter's decision to shift 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, Taiwan became 
a major victim of this policy, whereas the Communist government on 
the mainland (PRC) enjoyed that exclusive recognition. 
But the U.S. choice of which China to regard as "legitimate" 
during a given period of the Cold War era was also influenced by the 
strategic triangle involving the two Superpowers (the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union) and China. 
A Spatial Analysis of the Changing Triangular Relationships 
The following spatial models seek to conceptualize the changing 
dynamics of U.S.-Taiwan relations in light of the changing strategic 
11 For a thesis on how the United States used this feature to advance its Cold War 
policy of opposing Communist China, see John W. Garver, The Sino-American 
Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 
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triangle. 12 In these models, a solid line (.._ _ _,) denotes a formal 
relationship with or without an explicit military alliance, whereas a 
dotted line ( .......... ) denotes an informal relationship with or without 
an implicit or de facto military alliance. We can divide the history of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations from 1949 until the present into six periods 
(Figures 1-6). The shifts from one period to the next have been caused 
by important international or domestic developments, as we discuss 
them in tum. 
(Figures 1-6 about here) 
1. 1949-1950. The first period lasted from the Truman 
Administration's issuance of the White Papers 13 in August 1949 
(about the same time the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan) 
until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The Truman 
Administration blamed the KMT for the "loss of China" and ended its 
support of Chiang's beleaguered government. By adopting a "wait 
until the dust settled" attitude on the final outcome of the Chinese civil 
war, Truman anticipated an imminent military takeover of Taiwan by 
the Communists. But Mao Zedong's announcement upon the founding 
of the PRC in October 1949 to "lean to one (Soviet) side" and a series 
of "missed opportunities" thwarted the possibility of U.S.-China 
cooperation. The spatial model for this period is denoted by a solid 
line between China and the Soviet Union, and no line between the U.S. 
and Taiwan. The locations of these countries indicate which of the two 
rival camps-- the U.S. or the Soviet Union-- they belonged to. 
2. 1950-1969. The outbreak of the Korean War changed U.S. 
assessment of the security situation in East Asia, and caused a 
12 For an excellent discussion on the changing dynamics of the strategic triangle, 
see Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic 
Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
13 The United States Department of State, The White Papers, August 1949 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1967). 
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dramatic reversal of its hands-off policy toward Taiwan. The Truman 
Administration dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. This 
prevented a Communist attack on Taiwan (and a Nationalist attack on 
China), but also reinserted the U.S. into the unfinished Chinese civil 
war. China's entry into the war on behalfofNorth Korea14 put China 
at war directly with the U.S. and finally convinced the Truman 
Administration that the Chinese Communists were dangerous proteges 
of the Soviet-led expansionist International Communism, which 
intended to enslave the free world. Following the containment policy 
designed by George F. Kennan, IS the U.S. now regarded Taiwan as a 
vital link in the U.S. defense line, whose loss to Communist forces 
would imperil the U.S. position in Japan and the Philippines. 16 In 
1954, the Eisenhower Administration signed a mutual defense treaty 
with Taiwan as part of its efforts to complete the "frontiers" along the 
Sino-Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, the alliance between the Soviet Union 
and China continued throughout the 1950s. This period is denoted by 
two separate solid lines between the Soviet Union and China, and 
between the U.S. and Taiwan, respectively -- a testimony to the 
hardening ofEast-West cleavages. 
A gradual rift started to develop between the two communist 
giants. But the signs of a split between them did not become 
unmistakable to the Nixon Administration until 1969, when they 
fought a border war. The Sino-Soviet split heralded a major global 
14 See Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean 
War (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 
IS George F. Kennan ["X"], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, vol. 
25 (July 1947), pp. 566-582, and American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: New 
American Library, 1951 ). See also John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 2. 
16 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 
9. 
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strategic realignment. Nixon and his realpolitik aide, Henry Kissinger, 
aware of declining U.S. power, sought to use China as a strategic 
counterweight against Moscow. 
3. 1972-1978. The third period was marked by detente. 17 Nixon 
made a historic trip to China in 1972, and signed the Shanghai 
Communique, which would become the basis of U.S. China policy 
even until today. The U.S. forged a de facto anti-Soviet entente with 
China. Both sides concurred upon several regional issues (e.g., the 
Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and Southwestern Asia), and managed 
to set aside the so-called Taiwan issue. However, as conditions for 
normalizing relations with Beijing, the U.S. eventually ceded to the 
three Chinese demands: U.S. severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
abrogation of the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty, and withdrawal of 
U.S. forces from Taiwan. On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy 
Carter established diplomatic relations with the PRC, and severed 
formal ties with Taiwan. This period saw the solid line between the 
Soviet Union and China disappear, and a dotted line develop between 
the U.S. and China, whereas the U.S. still maintained formal ties with 
Taiwan. After 1979 the two lines the U.S. maintained with China and 
Taiwan switched places: solid for China and dotted for Taiwan. 
4. 1979-1987. Since 1979, the U.S. China policy has operated 
under an unusual, and uneasy, dual-track framework: U.S. relations 
with the P.R.C. were handled diplomatically (based on the three 
communiques), whereas U.S. relations with Taiwan were handled 
domestically (through the Taiwan Relations Act, TRA). 18 The TRA 
17 Nixon actually pursued two sets of detente: one between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, and the other between the U.S. and China. See John Spanier and Steven W. 
Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 13th ed. (Washington, DC; CQ 
Press, 1995), chap. 7. 
18 U.S. Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, April 10, 1979. The text of the Act can be 
found in Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, eds., Legislative History of the Taiwan 
Relations Act: An Analytic Compilation with Documents on Subsequent 
14 Tamk.ang Journal of International Affairs 
provided a legal framework for maintaining substantive U.S. relations 
with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations and a commitment 
to Taiwan's security -- by providing Taiwan with defensive weapons 
and by insisting upon a peaceful settlement of Taiwan's future. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. government sought to commit the PRC to a 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. China thus started its peace 
overtures wooing Taiwan, most exemplary of which was Deng 
Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" scheme. But by and large there 
was still very little contact between Taiwan and China. 
5. 1987-1995. This situation changed dramatically, mainly due to 
Taiwan's rapid democratization. In the two most recent periods, rapid 
domestic changes within Taiwan and between Taiwan and China have 
increasingly stretched the continued validity of the U.S. China policy 
as envisioned in the Shanghai Communique. In 1987, President 
Chiang Ching-kuo ended Martial Law, lifted the bans on registration 
of newspapers and political parties, and allowed Taiwan citizens to 
visit the mainland. 19 Trade and investments intensified. Indirect trade 
rose to over $40 billion in 2002. The accumulated Taiwanese 
investment in China is estimated at over $100 billion. China's export-
Developments (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982), pp. 
288-95 . As Stephen Solarz, the influential former Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of Representatives, pointed out, the TRA was 
enacted to solve "an unprecedented diplomatic problem": how to continue U.S. 
substantive relations with the people on Taiwan even though the U.S. government 
terminated diplomatic relations with the government in Taipei, as a precondition for 
normalization of relations with Beijing. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, Hearing and Markup, 
May 7, June 25, and August 1, 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1987), p. 1. 
19 For an account on how increased people-to-people interactions between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, the so-called "track-two diplomacy," have eased tension, 
see Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People 
Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1993). 
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oriented boom in recent years has benefited greatly from Taiwanese 
trade and investments. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan's polity democratized quickly. Lee Teng-hui, 
who succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo, became the first native Taiwanese 
President of the ROC. He accelerated the democratization process that 
was initiated by Chiang. The 194 7 Constitution was amended; all 
parliamentarians were elected in Taiwan; all the major executive heads, 
including the president of the ROC, were directly elected by the 
people. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency, marking the first 
peaceful transfer of executive power in any Chinese society. 
Accompanying the breathtaking democratization was a more 
assertive foreign policy approach, known as "pragmatic diplomacy" or 
"substantive diplomacy." Taiwan also replaced its old "three-noes" 
policy with a new endeavor to institutionalize cross-Strait (equal) 
negotiations, hopefully leading to some type of modus vivendi. In 
1992 Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (CEF) and China's 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) were 
founded to conduct bilateral relations in accordance with instructions 
from their respective governments. This cross-strait rapprochement is 
represented by a new dotted line between Taiwan and China. Taipei's 
approach is functionalist in nature: to accumulate experience and trust 
on "practical" and "peripheral" matters (e.g., fishing disputes, 
document verification, crime prevention) that can be used in the 
eventual "core" negotiations (political relationships between the two). 
China, however, seems more interested in immediate political talk that 
will lead to reunification. This modus vivendi lasted until1995, when 
President Bill Clinton, facing overwhelming congressional support for 
Lee, approved President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his alma mater in the 
U.S. 
6. 1995-. China reacted furiously to Lee's trip. It recalled its 
ambassador to Washington, jailed the American-Chinese human rights 
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activist, Harry Wu, canceled all talks with Taiwan, and launched war 
games to intimidate Taiwan. Both China-U.S. and China-Taiwan 
relations turned tense. Defying Chinese intimidation, Taiwan 
successfully held its first direct presidential election in March 1996, 
marking a milestone in Taiwan's democratization 20 and 
institutionalizing Taiwan's de facto independence. 21 Meanwhile, 
buoyed by popular support for joining the UN (differences on names 
notwithstanding), in 1993 Taiwan began a vigorous campaign to enter 
the UN. Taiwan's democratization has gone hand in hand with its 
quest for greater international recognition.22 Lee, the 1996 winner, 
and his successor, Chen, both sought to institutionalize Taiwan's 
relations with the U.S. and China - as exemplified by Lee's 1999 
"special state-to-state relations" and Chen's 2002 "one country on 
each side of the Taiwan Strait" remarks. This is denoted by the hoped-
for solid lines between Taiwan and the U.S. and between Taiwan and 
China. If that day should come, each dyad in this triangular 
relationship will be considered an inter-state relationship. Such a 
scenario will seriously undermine the continued validity of the current 
20 According to Samuel P. Huntington's criteria of contestation and participation, 
Taiwan's 1996 presidential election qualified as the inauguration of democracy in 
Taiwan. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13, 275. 
21 As Parris H. Chang, a DPP legislator defiantly said, "Sichuan and Guangdong 
(China's two largest provinces) don't elect a President, but Taiwan is going to do so, 
and that means that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign entity .. . The fact that we are 
going to the polls and can vote for a President means we are casting a vote for 
independence." New York Times, August 29, 1995, p. A5 . 
22 Gaining greater international recognition helps alleviate not just the frustration 
felt by the people of Taiwan about their country's diplomatic status. The 
"internationalization" of the Taiwan issue (as opposed to China's "internal affairs") 
also has important security implications for Taiwan; see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, 
"Does Democratization Enhance or Reduce Taiwan's Security? A Democratic-Peace 
Inquiry," Asian Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 3-19. 
Refunctionalizing a Frayed American China-Taiwan Policy: Incrementalism or Pmdigmatic Shift? 17 
U.S. "one China" policy. We will discuss this possibility in more 
detail, but first we will lay out the basic framework of the current U.S. 
policy toward Taiwan, and explain why the assumptions on which this 
framework was based may no longer be valid. 
THE INCREASINGLY UNBALANCED "DUAL TRACK" 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
As previously stated, the basic framework for U.S policy toward 
Taiwan since 1972 consists of one domestic law (The Taiwan 
Relations Act) and three communiques (1972, 1978, and 1982).23 
Seeking to maintain a balanced "dual track" policy toward China and 
Taiwan, this framework includes three interlocking principles: ( 1) 
compliance to a "one China" policy, (2) pragmatic development of 
relations with the PRC (diplomatically) and Taiwan (informally but 
cordially), and (3) commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes 
between China and Taiwan. 
This dual track policy contains elements of both creativity and 
ambiguity. The carefully crafted "creative ambiguity" has offered U.S. 
policy makers much flexibility, but it has also perpetuated some basic 
policy dilemmas. The Shanghai Communique states: "The U.S. 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China ... It 
reaffirms its interest in peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves." On the one hand, this clever "diplomatic lie" 
allowed the U.S. and the PRC to "agree to disagree" on the Taiwan 
issue in order to forge cooperation on other issues. On the other hand, 
23 Cf. Winston Lord (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
during Clinton's first term), "U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific" 
(statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House 
International Relations Committee, February 9, 1995), U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch, Vol. 6, No.9 (February 27, 1995), p. 145. 
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it arguably retained U.S. interest on the future of Taiwan by the 
insistence on peaceful settlement. 
These two sets of goals have sometimes clashed. For example, 
the August 17, 1982 Communique states: "The United States 
Government.. .intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, 
leading over a period of time to a final resolution." While the PRC 
insisted that the U.S. should gradually reduce, and eventually stop, 
arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. insisted that reduced U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan would be contingent upon the Chinese "fundamental policy" 
to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. 
When it comes to the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security, the 
U.S. policy is also ambiguous yet flexible. For example, Section 2 of 
the Taiwan Relations Act states that it is the policy of the U.S. to 
"consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the 
peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the 
U.S." However, the U.S. commitment stops short of a carte blanche to 
Taiwan. The same section only calls for the U.S. "to maintain the 
capacity ... to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that 
would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the 
people on Taiwan." For years this declaration has kept both Beijing 
and Taiwan wondering if the U.S. would militarily intervene at all in 
the event of a PRC attack against Taiwan. Part of the suspense was 
cleared by the Clinton Administration's decision to dispatch two 
aircraft carrier battle groups to Taiwan waters in March 1996 in 
response to the PRC's military intimidation of Taiwan before the 
island republic's first direct popular presidential elections. In April 
2001, President George W. Bush lifted more ambiguity by asserting 
that he would do "whatever it took" to help Taiwan defend itself. It 
was the clearest statement on U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security in 
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recent years.24 Bush's December 2003 comments cited at the outset 
added even more clarity to the U.S. policy. 
By managing the issue of Taiwan politically, this policy has 
managed to postpone a tough policy choice between the PRC and 
Taiwan. It certainly has achieved some success. Those involved in the 
policy-making itself like to claim credit for a policy that they claim 
has allowed the U.S. to establish diplomatic ties with an important 
country on the world stage, and at the same time safeguarded the 
security of a U.S. traditional ally. 
The balance between the two tracks, U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan 
relations, which this policy has painstakingly tried to maintain, as one 
analyst put, "is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, or even to 
define with a high degree of consensus." As a result, "the modalities 
of U.S. policy toward Taiwan are becoming outdated and 
dysfunctional in some instances."25 
The sources for this growing incongruity have to do with 
developments within Taiwan, China, and the U.S. New developments 
in Taiwan are especially important. In order to better understand the 
implications of the new parameters of U.S.-Taiwan relations, it is 
useful to contrast the fictional reality on which the Shanghai 
Communique paradigm was based and the present reality. 
BEYOND THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE: THE 
CHANGING PARAMETERS 
At the risk of oversimplification, Table 1 provides a stylized 
contrast between the context on which the Shanghai Communique 
24 Bush later backtracked somewhat, saying that his comments were made in the 
context of the one-China policy - they thus indicated a change of tone, but not 
substance. 
25 Martin L. Lasater, The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the 
Security of Taiwan (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 12. 
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paradigm was based and the context for the post-Cold War era. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 shows that many of the parameters that shaped the 
Shanghai Communique paradigm (SCP) have changed drastically, 
·causing the old paradigm to appear increasingly anachronistic and 
dysfunctional. There arguably exists a need to replace it with a new 
paradigm. This paper works to develop a post-Cold War paradigm 
(PCWP), which consists of the following fundamental parameters. 
Changing Strategic Environment 
The first main difference between the old and the new paradigms 
is the different strategic contexts. The SCP was developed for the 
Cold War era. The international system was dominated by superpower 
confrontation. Due to the ''balance of terror" caused by nuclear 
annihilation, the U.S. and the Soviet Union avoided direct military 
conflicts between them and channeled their conflicts to regional 
conflicts, known as "proxy wars." 
In this context, the U.S. and China shared certain common 
strategic interests. A rift had started developing between China and its 
mentor, the Soviet Union in late 1950s, culminating in a border war 
between them in 1969. China, seeking to avoid confrontations with 
both "hegemons" (the superpowers), concluded that the U.S. was a 
declining hegemon that now became a potential partner against the 
other more dangerous hegemon. 
Mired in a war in Vietnam at the time, the U.S. sought to 
gradually disengage itself from Asia. To the realpolitik-minded 
Richard Nixon and his top foreign policy aide, Henry Kissinger, the 
Sino-Soviet split promised strategic benefits, by offering the U.S. an 
opportunity to neutralize the threat of one communist giant (China) 
and use China as a counterweight against the chief threat to the U.S.-
the Soviet Union. 
The Nixon Administration signed the Shanghai Communique 
with Beijing with these broader strategic considerations in mind. The 
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communique promoted a rationale for the eventual normalization of 
U.S.-China relations within a broader geopolitical context. Both sides 
enunciated their common interests regarding reducing conflicts in 
Southeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Southwestern Asia. To 
pave the way toward normalization of U.S.-China relations, the U.S. 
and China arguably "agreed to disagree" on their irreconcilable 
positions on the Taiwan issue. The U.S. and China thus forged "a de 
facto alliance" or "an alliance by stealth" based on certain common 
geopolitical interests.26 
However, the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold 
War eroded the strategic rationale for this alignment. The U.S. no 
longer needed a "China card" against its nemesis, which had crumbled. 
In this "New World Order" global economic competition has 
replaced military conflicts. Democracy and the market economy have 
stood the test of time, prompting some to proclaim "the end of 
history."27 Yet at the same time, others contend that the post-Cold 
War era will be defined by a "clash of civilizations," with the main 
challenges to the West coming from Islamic and Confucian 
civilizations.28 One example ofthis civilizational clash is the "human 
rights versus 'Asian values"' debate, to which China has been a vocal 
contributor. 29 
26 Testimony of Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Jimmy Carter's National Security 
Advisor), in United States-China Relations: Today's Realities and Prospects for the 
Future. U.S. Congress, Senate, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
98th Congress, 2"d Session, May 17, 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1984), p. 29. 
27 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interests (Summer 1989), 
pp.3-19. 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign 
Affairs (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49. 
29 See Sidney Jones, "'Asian' Human Rights, Economic Growth, and United States 
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The end of the Cold War has also presented a changing security 
picture in East Asia. As the U.S. increasingly finds it difficult to 
maintain the kind of dominance it used to enjoy in the region, China 
seeks to fill the vacuum. Accommodating a rising China, with a fast-
'growing economy, irredentist goals, and assertive nationalism, has 
become one of the most difficult challenges for the foreign policy of 
the U.S. Considerable debates exist on China's intentions.30 The key 
question is whether China is a status quo power.31 Neo-realists and 
adherents of the "power transitions theory" alert the danger of such 
times.32 
In short, the strategic context that enabled the U.S. and China to 
forge a de facto alliance under the SCP has disappeared with the 
demise of the Soviet threat. Whereas the U.S. and China shared many 
common interests under the SCP, today many of their interests are 
divergent or contradictory - a point we will revisit. 
If the SCP's overwhelming strategic imperatives justified the 
subordination of U.S.-Taiwan relations under U.S.-China relations, 
then the disappearance of these strategic rationales made it hard for 
Policy," Current History (December 1996), pp. 419-427; Michael C. Davis, ed., 
Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and the first four articles by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Margaret Ng, Bilahari Kausikan, and Joseph Chan in Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 8, No.2 (April1997), pp. 3-48. 
30 See, for instance, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict 
with China (New York: Knopf, 1997) and Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, 
The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China 's Search for Security (New York: 
Norton, 1997). 
31 Alastair lain Johnston, "Is China A Status Quo Power?" International Security, 
Vol. 27, No.4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. . 
32 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 
2001), chapter 10; A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981 ). 
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the U.S. to continue its "exceptional" relationship with the PRC.33 
Continued subordination of US-Taiwan relations under US-China 
relations deprives the U.S. from dealing with Taiwan based on 
Taiwan's intrinsic value. 
Reconceptualizing Taiwan's Status 
A second key is a reconceptualization of Taiwan's status, 
especially on the part of Taipei. It is useful to briefly review the 
evolving conceptions of Taiwan's status held by Washington, Beijing, 
and Taipei. 
Many have mistakenly thought that the U.S. has accepted the 
PRC's one-China principle, which is based on a peculiar syllogism: (1) 
There is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part; (2) the PRC 
government is the sole legal government of all China; it then follows 
that (3) Taiwan is a part of the PRC.34 In other words, Beijing has 
refused to view Taiwan as anything more than a "renegade province" 
whose recovery, even by force, is entirely China's "internal affair." 
Some in Taiwan fear that Beijing's attempt to impose its so-called 
"one China" principle on all other countries will be "tantamount to 
verbally annexing the Republic ofChina."35 
But the U.S. government has not accepted the PRC's position on 
Taiwan. The U.S. position on Taiwan remains the same as the Truman 
33 James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with 
China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage, 2000). 
34 Starting in 2001, Beijing reformulated a new syllogism, presumably to make it 
more palatable to Taipei: (1) There is only one China; (2) Both Taiwan and the 
mainland belong to this China; and (3) China's sovereignty and territorial integrity 
cannot be encroached upon. Pundits like to divine whether this new formula 
indicated a new viewpoint or attitude toward Taiwan's status. In view of Beijing's 
steadfast opposition to Taipei's international participation, this new syllogism does 
not seem to suggest new substance. 
35 Government Information Office, Republic of China, "Looking Beneath the 
Surface of the 'One China' Question," http://www.taipei.org/mainland/mainland.htm. 
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Administration's -- the last time the U.S. made a statement about 
Taiwan's status. In the wake of North Korea's invasion of South Korea, 
President Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, 
essentially freezing the Chinese civil war, and asserted that "the 
determination of the future status of Formosa (Taiwan) must await the 
restoration of the security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, 
or consideration by the United Nations."36 
A careful reading of the three U.S.-China joint communiques 
(1972, 1978, 1982) shows that even after the U.S. transferred 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Washington still 
arguably has not deviated from the Truman Administration's formula. 
It nevertheless decided to deal with Beijing and Taipei based on a 
"one China" policy, because this served U.S. interests. As Harvey 
Feldman, a former U.S. alternate representative to the UN and the last 
Republic of China desk officer in the State Department when the 
Carter Administration severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, pointed 
out, 
Countries, including the U.S., can recognize Taiwan, but 
choose not to. They simply replace the old fiction, "one 
China, capital in Taipei," with a new fiction, "one China, 
capital in Beijing." The only sensible thing to do is to 
recognize one China and one Taiwan. 37 
The portion of the Shanghai Communique addressing this issue 
provides the origin of the so-called "one China" policy: The United 
States declared that it 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a 
36 American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2468. 
37 Harvey Feldman, personal communication, Washington, DC, July 9, 1997. 
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part of China. The United States Government does not 
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful 
settlement by the Chinese themselves (emphasis added). 
This oft-cited "axiom" contains many ambiguities. In diplomatic 
parlance, "acknowledgment" means "take cognizance of' or "is aware 
of;" It is not equivalent with "recognition"- the Chinese version. So it 
has allowed flexibility in U.S. policy. 
The basic thrust of this position was retained and repeated in the 
1979 communique that established diplomatic relations between the 
U.S. and the PRC and the 1982 communique on U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan. The 1979 communique recognized Beijing as the sole legal 
government of China, but not necessarily Beijing's position on 
Taiwan's status. Taiwan's exact status in the eyes of the U.S. 
government remains nebulous and open. As Dennis Hickey aptly put 
it, "As the United States has not committed itself to any particular 
solution to the Taiwan issue (except that it be peaceful), it may adapt 
easily to practically any eventuality."38 
If there has been no essential change in Beijing's principled 
stance and Washington's flexible positions on Taiwan's status, there 
have been some important changes in Taiwan's position on its own 
status since 1972. 
During the years of Chiang Kai-shek (1949-75) and Chiang 
Ching-kuo (1975-88), Taipei saw itself as the legitimate government 
of all China (despite the fact that it did not rule the much larger 
mainland) and Beijing as illegitimate "bandits." The Chiangs' 
steadfast opposition to "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" on 
the international scene was codified in the principled stance, "hanzei 
buliangli" (there is no room for both the legitimate and the 
38 Dennis VanVranken Hickey, Taiwan 's Security in the Changing International 
System (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1997), p. 196. 
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illegitimate). As long as Chiang coveted legitimacy, the U.S. could go 
along with his myth and use its clout in the UN to isolate Communist 
China. 
Unfortunately this position came back to haunt Taiwan starting in 
the 1970s, as all major countries shifted their recognition to Beijing, 
for it also maintained an unyielding "one China" stance. Leaders of 
the nascent opposition blamed Taiwan's adherence to the "one China" 
stance as the main culprit for Taiwan's rapidly deteriorating 
international status. There was a clear need for a new path. 
After becoming President, Lee Teng-hui worked to break this 
logjam by promoting "pragmatic diplomacy," wherein Taipei will 
pursue relations with other countries regardless of their ties with 
Beijing. He was also nominally committed to the "one China" idea, 
for Beijing had threatened to attack Taiwan should Taiwan declare 
independence. Nonetheless, "pragmatic diplomacy" was a clear 
departure from the old "one China" policy. In 1991 Lee abrogated the 
Temporary Provisions During the Period of Mobilization and 
Suppression of Rebellion, thereby effectively treating the PRC as the 
government controlling the mainland, over which the ROC had no 
control. This move was a tacit yet unambiguous abandonment of the 
"one-China" policy. Lee's formula of "one country, two governments" 
was only a thinly veiled version of "two Chinas" or "one China, one 
Taiwan." In 1999, he described cross-strait relations as "special state-
to-state" relations. 
The current DPP government formally espouses Taiwan 
independence. In order not to provoke the PRC, Chen gave the "five 
noes" assurance in his inauguration speech in May 2000 and offered to 
discuss "one China" with Beijing as a topic (yi-ti), but not accept it as 
a precondition (qian-ti) for entering talks with Beijing.39 
39 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "The Chen Shui-bian Administration's Mainland 
Policy: Toward a Modus Vivendi or Continued Stalemate?" American Asian Review, 
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In sum, Taiwan has moved slowly but surely away from its 
commitment to the idea of "one China" - a move, some contend, that 
has led to mounting tensions between China and Taiwan.40 In the 
context of the SCP, today at least a significant number of Chinese 
(namely those on Taiwan) do not share the SCP's view, i.e., there is 
but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. The most radical 
separatists even refute the word "Chinese," for they argue that the 
residents on Taiwan are Taiwanese, not Chinese. As Taiwan's 
democratization further develops, an increasing number of people on 
Taiwan may demand self-determination. At least a theoretical 
possibility exists that these "Chinese" on one side of the Taiwan Strait 
may want to, through their free choice, declare de jure independence. 
Should the U.S. accept this democratic result and change its policy 
toward Taiwan accordingly? Or should it continue to cling on a "one 
China" policy that seems diplomatically expedient for the U.S.? 
The upshot is that the status of Taiwan, as portrayed by the 
Shanghai Communique, was a fiction. It is incongruent with the 
present reality, and perhaps it never did comply with reality. For 
"realists" like Kissinger to pursue a policy based on fantasy, not reality, 
calls into question whether they were truly realistic. 
Another point about a changing conceptualization of Taiwan's 
status lies in Taiwan's importance on the world stage. In 1972 Taiwan 
was an authoritarian regime dominated by mainlanders who fled to 
Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek. Today Taiwan is a vibrant (albeit 
sometimes noisy) democracy dominated by native Taiwanese who do 
not necessarily identify with the mainland. In 1972 Taiwan was 
relatively insignificant economically: its gross national product was 
$7.9 billion, its per capita GNP was $552, its foreign trade amounted 
Vol. XX, No. 3 (Fal12002), pp. 91-124. 
40 International Crisis Group, "Taiwan Strait 1: What's Left of 'One China,"' ICG 
Asia Report, No. 53 (June 6, 2003), pp. 1-66. 
28 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
to $5.5 billion, and its foreign exchange holdings were less than $1 
billion. But today Taiwan is an economic powerhouse, with the 
world's 18th largest GNP ($529 billion), 25th highest per capita GNP 
($23,527), third largest foreign exchange holdings ($162 billion), and 
15th largest trade volume ($244 billion). 
In short, today's Taiwan is "too big to ignore," although China is 
also getting bigger. Treating such a democratic polity and economic 
powerhouse as an appendage or residue of U.S.-China relations not 
only contradicts reality but also defies morality. If the success of the 
SCP required that Taiwan be an insignificant authoritarian regime 
whose sacrifice was the necessary price to be paid for improving 
relations with Beijing, then an economically strong and politically free 
Taiwan has outgrown the straitjacket of the SCP. 
This new conceptualization of Taiwan's status is intimately 
related to the rapid democratization in Taiwan. 
Challenges ofTaiwan's Democratization 
Among all the new parameters ofU.S.-China relations, nothing is 
more important than Taiwan's democratization, which poses a serious 
challenge to the SCP. Democracy in Taiwan has added further appeal 
to the U.S., but it has also polarized American sentiments, with some 
even more committed to Taiwan and others worried about an 
uncontrollable Taiwan. A better understanding of the implications of 
Taiwan's democracy is needed. 
Since 1987 Taiwan's polity has quickly transformed from a one-
party dictatorship into a multi-party democracy. The direct popular 
election of President Lee Teng-hui in March 1996 was the capstone in 
this decade-long process of democratization. The ascension to power 
by Chen Shui-bian in 2000 not only was the first peaceful transfer of 
executive power in any Chinese society but also served to consolidate 
Taiwan's nascent democracy. Taiwan's democracy flourished even as 
China was conducting campaigns of military intimidation against 
Taiwan. An increasing number of Americans now consider Taiwan's 
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democracy as of great political and strategic importance to the U.S.41 
Although in the short run, democracy may imperil Taiwan's 
security (due to China's ire), in the long-term, it is the most important 
defense to Taiwan's security, because democracies usually have more 
affinity with other democracies, and have often come to the aid of 
those democracies being attacked by autocracies.42 
Given their own history of fighting for independence from 
England and their political philosophy stressing freedoms and liberty, 
Americans in principle support democracy. However, as practice, their 
support of self-determination has often run up against the calculus of 
interests. In the words of Ralph Clough, a former Deputy Chief of 
Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, "Democracy presents a 
dilemma. On the one hand, the U.S. favors democracy and, in 
principle, favors self-determination. But on the other hand, the U.S. is 
not prepared to send troops over others' right of self-determination.'.43 
The dilemma of Taiwan's democracy is a case in point. 
Democracy creates complexity and uncertainty. Political 
management under a democracy is more difficult than under an 
authoritarian government.44 Some U.S. elites are particularly worried 
41 See the speech given by Henry Hyde, Chairman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations, in Taipei on 24 August 2001, 
"Rep. Hyde Suggests Taiwan May Hold Key to China's Destiny," e-mail update sent 
by the State Department's "USINFO East Asia" iipgeap@PD.STATE.GOV; Stephen 
J. Yates, "The Challenge of Taiwan's Democracy for the United States and China," 
The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 272 (April12, 1996), p. 1. 
42 For a survey of the "democratic peace" theory (or the "Democracies do not fight 
each other" thesis), please see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: 
Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993). See also William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88 (March 1994), 
pp. 14-32. 
43 Ralph Clough, personal communication, Washington, DC, July 9, 1997. 
44 Richard H. Solomon, President, the United States Institute of Peace, and a former 
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that the tail (Taiwan's democracy and consequent "creeping 
independence") may drag the dog (U.S.-China relations), 45 and 
openly called for "reining in" the irresponsible democrats in Taiwan. 
Chas. W. Freeman, a former senior Pentagon official, blatantly warned, 
" ... Washington cannot afford to leave Taiwanese with the impression 
that they have a blank check to fill out with American blood.'.46 
Despite these problems, most former and current policymakers 
still think that the U.S. should support Taiwan's democracy. Anthony 
Lake, National Security Advisor during Clinton's first term, said, "It 
(Taiwan's democracy) serves as a model of how democracy can grow 
in an Asian setting.'.47 Democracy in Taiwan is thus consistent with 
the Clinton Administration's strategy of "enlargement" (of market 
democracies).48 Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense and a 
former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
affirms that "Although Taiwan's democracy may cause some 
problems, the U.S. should still support it, because it will have a 
positive impact on the PRC.'.49 Natale Bellochi, former Managing 
Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, cautioned that "It was a 
mistake for the U.S. to have not voiced enough support for Taiwan's 
democracy, because we show too much sensitivity to Beijing's 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, personal 
communication, Washington, DC, July 11, 1997. 
45 See, for example, Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key is Better US. Relations with 
China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). 
46 Chas. W. Freeman, "Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics," Foreign Policy, 
Vol. 104 (Fall 1996), p. 17. 
47 Anthony Lake, personal communication, Washington, DC, July 7, 1997. 
48 Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993), p. 3. 
49 Paul Wolfowitz, personal communication, Washington, DC, July 11, 1997. 
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reaction. "50 
Indeed, Freeman's warning seems misguided. Feldman pointed 
out that ''Taiwan's voters are smart and responsible, because most 
polls show that most voters prefer the status quo." 51 Even a 
Taiwanese-American lawyer who was active in the Taiwan 
Independence Movement, that is, the very type of people Freeman 
distrusts, took issue with him: 
Taiwan will not need the U.S. to send even one soldier. We 
only ask the U.S. to leave Taiwan alone, and stop always 
ingratiating China. Taiwan will not formally declare 
independence, because Taiwan is already an independent 
country. 52 
Jason C. Hu, Taiwan's former envoy to Washington, said that 
Beijing has only itself to blame if it perceives Taiwan's 
democratization as "creeping independence," because 
separatism is in fact fueled by Beijing's unrelenting pressure 
against Taiwan. This hurts Beijing's own reunification goal. 
Independence is a cliche. The Republic of China has long 
been independent. Thus, maintaining the status quo should 
be easy. Taiwan's democracy should not be equated with 
separatism, because "independence" implies a permanent 
cut-off from the mainland. 53 
Taiwan's democracy is imperfect yet unquestionable. By contrast, 
China shattered its international image in the 1989 Tiananmen 
50 Natale Bellochi, personal communication, Washington, DC, July 8, 1997. 
51 Harvey Feldman, personal communication, July 9, 1997. 
52 Yea-tung (Y.T.) Hung, personal communication, Vienna, Virginia, July 10, 1997. 
53 Jason C. Hu, Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 
Office in the U.S.A., personal communication, Washington, DC, July 10, 1997. 
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massacre and the 1996 war games against Taiwan. As a result, despite 
the increasing economic ties between China and Taiwan (which 
Beijing no doubt thinks is conducive to reunification), the political 
chasm between them has widened. Thus, democratization in Taiwan 
may fuel nationalism in both China and Taiwan, with China feeling 
increasingly hopeless about a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, 
Taiwan feeling increasingly compelled to seek independence as a 
result of China's tightening squeeze, and the U.S. feeling itself 
increasingly losing control of the situation. Taiwan's democracy thus 
entails grave international consequences. 
Democracy on Taiwan makes it increasingly difficult for the U.S. 
to overlook Taiwan's interests while seeking improved relations with 
China. Even Clinton affirmed that any solution to the issue of Taiwan 
must have the "assent of the people of Taiwan." Taiwan has proved 
that free enterprise and democracy are compatible with and desirable 
in a Chinese setting. Its viability vindicates American values and 
deserves American respect. Although some people argue that Lee 
Teng-hui's private visit to the U.S. in 1995 was a "serious mistake," 
the only mistakes were the U.S.'s poor handling of the matter and 
China's belligerent response. As the beacon of democracy and human 
rights, the U.S. found it indefensible to treat the first popularly elected 
leader in five thousand years of Chinese history as even less worthy 
than former terrorists Y asser Arafat and Gerry Adams. 
For China, democracy on Taiwan denies Beijing's self-
proclaimed capacity to speak for the people of Taiwan. Beijing fears 
democracy on Taiwan. Democracy makes the government of Taiwan 
less predictable and harder to control, since it now must respond to the 
electorate's competing interests or be voted out of office. Democracy 
also increases the sympathy of the world's other democracies for 
Taiwan. Beijing further dreads it because it contrasts so strikingly with 
the leadership selection process on the mainland. In fact, it strikes at 
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the very heart of the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy.54 In sum, 
democracy on Taiwan creates uncertainty and complication for 
Beijing's efforts to unify with Taiwan. It threatens to 
"internationalize" the Taiwan issue and challenges the CCP's own 
legitimacy. 
For Taiwan, democracy holds great strategic importance. 
Democracy is the best insurance for Taiwan's security, as fellow 
democracies are more likely to support a democratic Taiwan in the 
event of a PRC attack. Democracy also serves as a model, by 
challenging Beijing to change in a way that will make Taiwan's future 
reunification with the mainland more compatible with the interests of 
the people of Taiwan. 
Taiwan's democratization is an enormously important 
development with far-reaching implications for Washington, Taipei, 
and Beijing. It is the most crucial new parameter that challenges the 
SCP. As Taiwan has , experienced fundamental changes, the 
relationship between Washington and Beijing has also fundamentally 
changed. 
Changing Nature ofU.S.-China Relations 
The U.S.-China relationship from 1972 to 1989 was one- · 
dimensional: namely, it was based on the two nation's common 
strategic interests in countering the Soviet Union and reducing 
regional tension. This relationship was defined in classic realpolitik 
terms, with emphasis on military and strategic aspects but not on 
internal political or moral aspects. 
Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's policies of 
economic restructuring and opening to the outside world, the 
relationship between the U.S. and China has become a "multifaceted" 
one- to use former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's phrase. 
Many new issues have emerged that were simply nonexistent in 1972, 
54 Stephen Yates, "The Challenge of Taiwan's Democracy," p. 3. 
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for example, human rights, weapons proliferation, trade disputes, 
alleged attempts to influence the political process through illegal 
campaign contributions, struggle for global preeminence, etc. - many 
of which are quite contentious and require careful management. The 
SCP is a one-dimensional paradigm, and is thus a misfit for a 
multifaceted relationship. 
At the heart of the long list ofbilateral disputes, which include all 
of the above plus Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, 
is the fundamental question of how to cope with a rising China. 
During the Clinton Administration, the mainstream view was 
"constructive engagement." But many Americans viewed a rising 
China warily. A highly unusual coalition of anti-Chinese sentiment 
emerged, consisting of liberal human rights and prison labor activists 
to conservative religious fundamentalists, from military strategists to 
politicians and scholars. The pervasiveness of such sentiments at the 
grassroots level was also confirmed in various opinion polls. 55 
China's skyrocketing trade surplus with the U.S., which 
surpassed that of Japan's in recent years, market barriers to foreign 
goods and services, alleged illegal campaign contributions, alleged 
exports of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, the transfer of 
civilian technology imported from the U.S. to military use, an abysmal 
human rights record, military intimidation against Taiwan, and 
assertive maneuvers in the South China Sea all made it difficult for the 
Clinton Administration to be overly accommodating to China for fear 
of adverse political repercussions. The Bush administration, which 
basically inherited the engagement policy, was instinctively more 
wary when dealing with the PRC. 
The successful management of the relationship with China will 
55 See The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 1995; 1991; 1987. The Harris Polls asks respondents to label 
certain countries as "ally," "friendly," "not friendly," or "enemy." 
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no doubt occupy the energy and wisdom of any future U.S. 
government. But it is clear that even if the "pesky" ''Taiwan problem" 
ceases to exist, U.S.-China relations still have many real and potential 
sources of friction. A one-dimensional relationship established under 
the SCP simply cannot cope with the challenges presented by a 
complex and multifaceted relationship. Engagement must be 
conditional, with clear criteria for reward or punishment, rather than 
one-sided appeasement. 56 Appeasement will earn neither China's 
respect nor its cooperation, as the Clinton administration found out 
and the Bush administration was not eager to repeat. 
By examining these key new parameters of U.S.-Taiwan relations 
in the post-Cold War era- the changing strategic environment, the 
new conceptions of Taiwan's status, Taiwan's democratization, and 
changing U.S.-China relations, it is clear that the SCP is stretched to 
its limits, if not outmoded already. A new paradigm, the post-Cold 
War paradigm, should be based on these new parameters and promote 
U.S. relations with Taiwan based on Taiwan's own merits and 
Washington's interests, rather than Beijing's mood. It should also 
accommodate Taiwan's positive contributions to the international 
community. 
REFUNCTIONALIZING A FRAYED PARADIGM? 
SEARCHING FOR A NEW ONE? 
The SCP, as an intellectual standard and a prudent policy, proved 
remarkably resilient. But no policy is intrinsically infallible through 
changing historical and strategic contexts. In the case of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan, it cannot be called a realistic policy, for it_ is based 
more on the "one China" fiction than the "one China, one Taiwan" 
reality. Ironically, the SCP, which purported to be the most realistic 
56 James Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New 
York: Council for Foreign Relations, 1996). 
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policy actually turned out to be the most fictive policy. U.S.-Taiwan 
relations were contingent upon U.S.-China ties. 
The SCP entails simultaneously inherent ambiguity ("one China") 
and consistency ("peaceful settlement"). However, due to 
·developments in Taiwan, China, and Washington that have outgrown 
the SCP, the "strategic ambiguity" in the SCP is increasingly 
untenable. 
The 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis helped each party delineate the 
contours of the SCP. Beijing asserted its resolve to keep Taiwan from 
declaring independence. It also "tested the water" on possible U.S. 
reaction to its military action against Taiwan. The U.S. demonstrated 
its resolve to use force to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It also 
became increasingly concerned about possible fallout from Taiwan's 
democracy. Taiwan showed its resolve to move forward with political 
liberalization, in defiance of Beijing's military threat. At stake in the 
U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular game is Asia's peace and stability. 
The crisis was defused when Beijing deferred to Washington's 
show of force. Washington now tells Beijing in unambiguous terms 
the consequences of a military attack against Taiwan. In this regard, 
Speaker Newt Gingrich's statement in China served as a clarification 
of the bottom line. While avowing his agreement with the 
Administration's support for a one-China policy that opposes formal 
independence for Taiwan and preserves the hope that the island will be 
reunited peacefully with the mainland someday, he told the Chinese 
that "We will defend Taiwan if it were militarily attacked. Period."57 
Although his warning helped to restore some civility in the 
Taiwan Strait, some worry that an even more serious crisis will 
57 Seth Faison, "Gingrich Warns China that U.S. Would Act if It Attacked Taiwan," 
New York Times (March 31, 1997): AI, A8; "Newt Gingrich on China" (editorial), 
New York Times (April I, 1997): A28; Patrick E. Tyler, "Unfazed by Gingrich, China 
Agrees with Some of What He Said," New York Times (April2, 1997): A4. 
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happen. Ted Carpenter likens the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis to the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: 
Just like the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
China, knowing that it is still no match to the U.S., must 
back down at the time, but the humiliation will toughen its 
determination to build up so that next time when there is 
another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, it won't back 
down."58 
An early indication of this attitude was already revealed during 
the 1996 crisis: China hinted that it had missiles that can hit Los 
Angeles, thinking that the U.S. would not intervene for it presumably 
would value Los Angeles more than Taiwan. In other words, China 
sought to equalize the military power differential between China and 
the U.S. by taking the "nuclear option" out of the equation, and by 
engaging the U.S. in a conventional war, in which China believes it 
can prevail. 
Is the solution, then, to give up Taiwan, or pressure Taiwan into 
accepting a deal dictated by Beijing? No. The U.S. has many options, 
including issuing a point-blank advance warning to Beijing, assisting 
Taiwan to develop a "porcupine defense" that will make China's 
invasion prohibitively costly, and reserving the capacity (i.e., a wide 
range of options) to respond to the crisis by taking into account the 
circumstances at the time. But the current policy - insisting on a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue without empowering Taiwan 
with some semblance of equality vis-a-vis Beijing - is not adequate 
and increasingly dangerous. 
· However, defining U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the post-Cold 
War era encounters mitigating factors. Some of these factors call for a 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan, independent of and unrelated to the U.S. 
58 Ted Galen Carpenter, personal communication, July 8, 1997. 
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China policy. Other factors suggest that the Taiwan issue will remain a 
factor in the U.S.-China relationship. The net effect is difficult to 
quantify. This suggests that the end of the changing circumstances 
after the end of the Cold War necessitates some serious thinking on 
this issue. Three broad scenarios can serve as models for U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan in the post-Cold War era. Each has differing degrees of 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Disengagement 
The first scenario is disengagement. This policy calls for the U.S. 
to accept the PRC's position on Taiwan and in fact pressure Taiwan to 
start negotiations with the PRC on reunification (largely on Beijing's 
terms). The justification for this model is that China has emerged as a 
very important country with growing global weight in the post-Cold 
War era. The U.S. needs its cooperation on many issues, including the 
war on terror, non-proliferation, peace on the Korean Peninsula, 
environmental degradation, trade cooperation, etc. The U.S. can not 
afford to take on this emerging giant on so many fronts, especially on 
an issue that touches China's most sensitive nerve on sovereignty. The 
Taiwan issue is really sui generis, and that is only Taipei's problem. 
By supporting Taiwan, the U.S. risks a hostile and recalcitrant partner 
and a potential enemy. If China's track record on Hong Kong appears 
acceptable, this will lend even more support to a gradual U.S. 
disengagement. 
The main advantage of this approach, naturally, is that it can 
arguably eliminate an irritant called the ''Taiwan problem," which has 
hampered a true and complete partnership between the U.S. and China, 
and, since China presumably will use peaceful means to achieve 
unification, it fulfills U.S. insistence on a peaceful settlement. The 
main disadvantages are two-fold: it calls into serious question among 
U.S. allies about U.S. credibility, and it may not be in the best self-
interests of the U.S. 
Martin Lasater correctly pointed out the pitfalls of moving away 
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from a policy of supporting the process of a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue to a policy of backing a specific outcome of that policy. 
He argued: 
(1} A consensus on Taiwan's future does not yet exist among the 
people of Taiwan themselves. Such a consensus may, or may not, 
support unification with the mainland. 
(2) Taipei has many motives in increasing contact with the 
mainland, not all of which are designed to achieve unification. 
The U.S. should not assume unification in the near future is the 
preferred choice of the Taiwanese government. 
(3) For the U.S. to support reunification would weaken Taiwan's 
negotiating position with the mainland and thus may harm the 
interests of the Taiwanese people. 
(4) Beijing has not yet worked out the mechanisms for the 
successful integration of a capitalist economy with mainland's 
socialist economy. The fate of Hong Kong after 1997 should first 
be observed. 
(5) The continuation of China's reform program and open 
policies after the death of Deng .. .is not assured. The leadership 
succession ... should first be observed. 
(6) Adequate studies have not been made on the impact of 
China's reunification on U.S. interests. Such analysis is 
especially important in the post-Cold War period as the PRC 
modernizes its armed forces and acquires power projection forces. 
(7) The status quo in the Taiwan Strait continues to serve U.S. 
interests admirably well. A change in U.S.-China-Taiwan policy 
should be undertaken with great caution. 59 
Delillking or Decoupling 
The second scenario is delinking. This policy calls for the U.S. to 
59Martin L. Lasater, The Changing of the Guards: President Clinton and the Security 
ofTaiwan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 150-51. 
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recognize Taiwan's intrinsic value and its value to the U.S. Based on 
these assessments, Taiwan deserves a separate relationship with the 
U.S. that is not subject to the ups and downs in U.S.-China relations. 
This policy is based on the political realities in Taiwan, and prepares 
the U.S. to recognize Taiwan, if the people of Taiwan should decide, 
through democratic means (e.g., a plebiscite), that they want separate 
statehood, official names notwithstanding. 
This policy's main advantage is that it frees the U.S. once and for 
all in its dealing with Taiwan in a way that resonates with American 
values. The U.S. can then pursue its national interests in dealing with 
Taiwan, without endless concessions to the "bigger and more 
important" China. This is essentially a "two Chinas" or "one China, 
one Taiwan" policy. 
The biggest drawback is that it risks a very belligerent PRC 
response, and most certainly the use of force against Taiwan. However, 
as the Clinton Administration's Taiwan policy review in 1994 showed, 
no matter how small the improvements the U.S. makes in upgrading 
its relations with Taiwan, China will not be satisfied and is likely to 
react very negatively. So a clear and decisive shift is arguably 
preferable than a protracted and constant rift. After weighing costs and 
benefits, China may decide to accept the U.S. decision, because 
presently China needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs China. 
Since the Chinese reaction is uncertain, the U.S. should seriously 
consider this option when two conditions are in place: (1) the initiative 
comes from Taiwan, not from the U.S.: that is, only after the 
Taiwanese people and government have decided through democratic 
means for formal independence and requested diplomatic recognition 
will the U.S . recognize the new country, and (2) there exists a good 
probability that once the U.S. takes the lead, the world's major 
countries will overcome their "collective action" problem regarding 
Taiwan. Judging from Bush's recent comments, the U.S. does not 
encourage this option (1). 
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Some Americans see "creeping independence" as a major 
destabilizer in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, and should be brought 
under control. This view is debatable. Although the U.S. can 
legitimately dissuade Taipei not to provoke Beijing, it is on shaky 
ground to simultaneously preach freedom and democracy and deny 
the fundamental right of the Taiwanese people. If the people in Taiwan 
vote to formally separate from China through peaceful means, the U.S. 
may be hard pressed not to come to Taiwan's aid. 
Although the U.S. insists upon a peaceful solution reached by the 
Chinese themselves on the Taiwan issue, it should understand that 
negotiation itself may not be neutral, because so far the PRC has not 
shown any other proposal that is more appealing than Deng's "one 
country, two systems" scheme, which designates Beijing as the central 
government and Taiwan only as a local government. The Taiwanese 
people have long rejected this formula, because it asks them to accept 
an uncertain offer that includes exactly the same as, or maybe even 
less than, what they already have, and entrust their fate on Beijing's 
self-restraint- a dubious proposition, if not an outright leap of faith. 
A "peaceful surrender" will infamously mock the U.S. principle 
of"peaceful settlement." Nothing meaningful can come out if the two 
sides are too lopsided. The U.S. should thus not further add to 
Beijing's leverage, but restore a balance between Taiwan and China. 
To prepare Taiwan for the negotiating table, the U.S. should start 
empowering Taiwan internationally. Relative formal equality between 
Beijing and Taipei can produce an equitable political solution different 
from a non-military version of surrender. The U.S. should support 
Taiwan's entry to the World Health Organization (WHO), the World 
Bank (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and even the 
UN. Taiwan's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) shows that steadfast 
American support is a necessary condition for overcoming the PRC's 
opposition. Take the WTO, which Taiwan joined in 2002. The U.S. 
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successfully used Taiwan's accession as a catalyst for bringing China 
in line with the WT0.60 
Improved Status Quo 
The third model is status quo. This policy calls for incremental 
improvements in U.S.-Taiwan relations, by making pragmatic 
adjustments in accordance with the changing realities in Taiwan. 
Expanding bilateral relations to the highest "unofficial" and cordial 
level and supporting Taiwan's entry into international economic and 
non-political organizations will be positive steps in this regard. In 
other words, it pays lip service to the "one China" policy and 
continues to try to maintain a tenuous dual-track policy. Yet at the 
same time, policy-makers should clearly understand that this policy 
may soon "exhaust" its usefulness, because its uneasy contradictions 
and ambiguities are quickly overtaken by events. Consequently, 
failure to move forward is tantamount to retrogression. Bush appears 
to have adhered to this school of thought. 
Policy debates resemble intellectual and scientific debates. 
Thomas Kuhn's classic The Structure of the Scientific Revolution 
argues that intellectual and scientific advance consists of the 
displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly 
incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new 
paradigm that accounts for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion. 
For over thirty years the Shanghai Communique paradigm has 
deftly guided the U.S. through turbulent diplomatic waters, balancing 
its heart and mind, idealism and realism. But just like the Cold War 
paradigm (bipolarity) that was capable of explaining the Cold War 
becomes increasingly obsolete in the post-Cold War era, the "one 
China" formula seems increasingly anachronistic. How much longer 
this patchwork policy can serve Washington, Taipei, and Beijing is 
60 Greg Mastel, "Let Taiwan into WTO Now," The Journal of Commerce, August 
14, 1997. 
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anybody's guess. In the meantime, much research and debate is 
needed on what is required to replace the "one China" paradigm. After 
all, it is easier to announce the end of an era than to name the new 
era.61 
61 James Atlas, "Name That Era: Pinpointing A Moment On the Map of History," 
New York Times, March 19, 1995, section 4, p. 1. 
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Table 1: The Shanghai Communique Paradigm and the Incongruent 
Realities 
The Shanghai The Post-Cold War 
Communique Paradigm 
Paradigm 
Strategic environment Cold War: "The New World 
Superpower Order"?: 
confrontation Military unipolarity? 
Regional conflicts Economic 
Detente multipolarity? 
Geostrategic Regional integration 
realignment & residual conflicts 
Democratization 
The PRC's strategic High (as a Low (as an anti-
value to the U.S. counterweight to the Soviet counterweight) 
Soviet Union) or 
high? (as either an 
archrival or an 
important partner for 
the next century) 
U.S. and Chinese Congruent: anti- Conflictual? Struggle 
interests in Asia Soviet Union, for regional 
reducing conflicts on preeminence (Pax 
the Korean Peninsula, Americana v. Pax 
and in Southeast Asia Sinica), status quo 
and Southwestern power v. anti-status 
Asia quo power 
"Realities" regarding "The United States "One country, two 
Taiwan's status acknowledges that all governments" 
Chinese on either side "One country, two 
of the Taiwan Strait (equal) political 
maintain there is but entities" 
one China and that "Special state-to-state 
Taiwan is a part of relations" 
China." "One country on each 
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side of the Taiwan 
Strait" 
Taiwan's polity Authoritarian Democratic 
Dominated by Dominated by 
mainlanders Taiwanese 
Taiwan' s economy Insignificant Powerhouse 
Gross national US$ 7.9 billion US$ 282 billion 
product (1972) (2002, market 
exchange rate) 
US$529 billion 
(2002, PPP) 
Per capita GNP US$ 552 (1972) US$12,538 (2002, 
market exchange rate) 
US$ 23,527 (2002, 
PPP) 
Foreign exchange US$ 0.95 billion US$ 162 billion 
holdings (1972) (2002) 
Foreign trade US$ 5.5 billion US$ 244 billion 
(1972) (1992) 
Cross-strait contacts Virtually non-existent Close economic ties 
China's outward Restricted by the Opening to the 
orientation Cultural Revolution outside world 
Axis ofU.S.-China Realpolitik "Multifaceted" 
relations 
Role ofhuman rights Conveniently Increasingly 
in U.S.-China overlooked important and 
relations contentious 
American domestic Antiwar "Donorgate" 
politics Disengagement Concern about 
China' s rise 
